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ABSTRACT
     The Asian Crisis has highlighted the importance of strong domestic financial systems in
overall economic development and stabilization.  Less agreement is evident on the role of
foreign banks in achieving this goal.  We explore this issue by studying bank-specific data on
lending by domestically- and foreign-owned banks in Argentina and Mexico.  We find that
foreign banks generally have had higher loan growth rates than their domestically-owned
counterparts, with lower volatility of lending, contributing to lower overall volatility of credit.
Additionally, in both countries, foreign banks show notable credit growth during crisis periods.
In Argentina, the loan portfolios of foreign and domestic privately-owned banks are similar, and
lending rates analogously respond to aggregate demand fluctuations. In Mexico, foreign and
domestic banks with lower levels of impaired assets have similar loan responsiveness and
portfolios. State-owned banks (Argentina) and banks with high levels of impaired assets
(Mexico) have more stagnant loan growth and weak responsiveness to market signals.   Overall,
these findings suggest that bank health, and not ownership per se, is the critical element in the
growth, volatility, and cyclicality of bank credit. Diversity in ownership appears to contribute
to greater stability of credit in times of crisis and domestic financial system weakness.    
Linda Goldberg B. Gerard Dages
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street 33 Liberty Street




Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045  1
1.  Introduction 
 
During the past decade, numerous financial systems have opened up to direct foreign 
participation through the ownership of local financial institutions, frequently as a direct 
consequence of -- and a perceived solution to -- financial crises. Significant increases in 
foreign participation in domestic financial systems have characterized the transition experience 
of Eastern Europe, and the post-Tequila period in Latin America.  The experience in Crisis 
Asia has been markedly different to date, however, and is more notable for the limited nature 
of majority investments by foreign banks, despite the need for large-scale recapitalization of 
the region’s troubled financial systems.   
Arguments supporting a policy of openness to foreign participation are far from 
universally accepted. The benefits for emerging markets of foreign participation in domestic 
financial systems are widely exposited and argued to be broad-based.  These arguments are, 
however, mirrored by a set of concerns over the potentially adverse effects of opening to 
foreign participation (or at least opening too quickly).  There is a shortage of hard evidence to 
support  either side. 
This paper attempts to contribute factually to the debate over the role of financial 
openness in emerging markets by exploring the experiences of Argentina and Mexico – two of 
the emerging markets that exhibit a significant degree and duration of foreign bank activity. 
Our first steps are to recap the opposing arguments regarding the role of foreign-owned banks 
in emerging markets. Next, we argue that ownership per se is not a reason to expect differences 
in the lending patterns of domestic and foreign banks: instead, differences would arise because 
of lending objectives, funding patterns, market access, and health.  
We then review recent liberalization efforts in both Argentina and Mexico, and 
examine patterns in local lending by foreign-owned and domestically-owned local banks, 
including state-owned banks.
1 Our goal is to document the relative stability in lending by these 
banks to different client bases and to examine the cyclical properties of such lending. 
Throughout, we base our analysis on published quarterly loan data for individual banks in 
Mexico and in Argentina in the 1990s. We examine total lending, personal/consumer lending, 
                                                            
1 We define “foreign-owned” to reflect majority control; this definition does not necessarily imply majority share 
ownership.   2
mortgage lending, and the broad remaining group that includes commercial, government, and 
other loans. 
Econometrically, we show that in Mexico and Argentina differences in behavior are 
apparent across some types of banks. The differences are related to whether or not a bank is 
public or private, potentially reflecting the role of different lending motives across these 
institutions. Bank responsiveness also is significantly related to the asset quality of the bank 
portfolio. In response to some types of economic fluctuations, domestic privately-owned banks 
with low impaired-loan shares can have more volatile lending than their foreign bank 
counterparts. We argue that these differences are plausible and to be expected, especially if 
these banks rely on different sources of funds.  
Overall, based on bank lending patterns from 1994 through the middle of 1999, we do 
not find any support for the view that foreign banks contribute to instability or are excessively 
volatile in their responses to market signals. In Argentina, the extensive and rapid reforms in 
banking have led to a system where both foreign and domestic privately-owned banks are 
responsive to market signals, but where behavior is now consistent with a more diversified 
funding base. In Mexico, despite reform efforts in the second half of the 1990s, many domestic 
banks continue to face significant asset quality problems.  We find that these banks have had 
shrinking loan portfolios in the post-crisis period.  Healthy foreign banks have emerged as an 
important engine of growth for funding local investment and growth opportunities, without 
raising lending volatility in comparison to their local counterparts.  
  
2.  Foreign Ownership of Emerging Market Financial Institutions 
 
Arguments in Favor of Foreign Bank Participation 
 
Arguments in favor of opening domestic financial sectors to foreign ownership have 
been primarily threefold. First, consistent with traditional arguments in support of capital 
account liberalization, foreign bank presence is argued to increase the amount of funding 
available to domestic projects by facilitating capital inflows. Foreign bank presence may also 
increase the stability of available lending, by diversifying the capital and funding bases   3
supporting the supply of domestic credit, an argument that appears especially persuasive for 
small and/or volatile economies.
2  
Second, foreign banks are argued to improve the quality, pricing, and availability of 
financial services, both directly as providers of such enhanced services and indirectly through 
competition with domestic financial institutions (Levine 1996).  Finally, foreign bank presence 
is argued to improve financial system infrastructure, including accounting and transparency, 
financial regulation, and through stimulating the increased presence of such supporting agents 
as rating agencies, auditors, and credit bureaus  (Glaessner and Oks 1994). A foreign presence 
may also enhance the ability of financial institutions to effectively measure and manage risk. 
Foreign bank presence may import financial system supervision and supervisory skills from 
home country regulators.  While many of these goals may ultimately be achievable without 
foreign financial institutions, increased foreign presence may meaningfully accelerate the 
process. 
While there is a sizeable body of research exploring the potential benefits of financial 
liberalization broadly defined, few studies have focused specifically on the potential benefits of 
increased foreign participation in banking and finance.
3 For the most part, these studies focus 
on bank efficiency spillovers, but not lending behaviors. For example, a recent cross-country 
study shows that foreign bank presence has been associated with lower profitability and lower 
overhead expenses for domestic banks, hence with enhanced domestic bank efficiency 
(Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 1998)
4.  Findings of increased domestic bank 
efficiency and heightened competition also are supported in the Argentine experience in the 
mid-1990s (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato, and Molinari 1999). Increased foreign competition in 
corporate loan markets reduced associated net margins and before-tax profits; margins and 
profits remained higher in the consumer sector that had not attracted comparable foreign 
                                                            
2 Some of these arguments parallel those supporting the recent repeal in the United States of the McFadden Act, 
which restricted interstate bank branching and limited diversification of U.S. bank loan portfolios. Meltzer (1998), 
for example, emphasizes the importance of risk diversification as an argument for removing legal and regulatory 
obstacles to bank branching internationally. 
3Other work considers the post-liberalization dynamics of deposit taking and its responsiveness to bank riskiness 
in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Canada (Peria and Schmukler, 1999; Gruben, Koo, and Moore, 1999). 
4 Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Ross Levine, and Hong-Ghi Min (1998) present similar results.   4
entry.
5 Evidence on behavioral comparisons between foreign and domestically-owned banks 
remains largely undocumented. 
 
Arguments Against Foreign Bank Participation 
Arguments against opening domestic financial systems to foreign ownership in part 
mirror the arguments presented above. One strand of concern argues that foreign-owned 
financial institutions will in fact decrease the stability of aggregate domestic bank credit, by 
providing additional avenues for capital flight, or by more rapidly withdrawing from local 
markets in the face of crisis (either in the host or home country).  A second argument relates to 
concerns that foreign financial institutions “cherry pick” the most lucrative domestic markets 
or customers, leaving less competitive domestic institutions to serve other (more risky) 
customers and increasing the risk borne by domestic institutions. Independent of the effect on 
aggregate credit generally or during crisis, the distribution of credit may be impacted, resulting 
in redistribution and potential crowding out of some segments of local borrowers. 
These concerns blur into similar arguments centered on the principle that financial 
services represent a strategic industry that is best controlled by domestic interests, especially in 
the context of a state-directed development model in which domestic banks serve identified 
development interests. Such arguments, however, are especially likely to be voiced by 
domestic concerns that will be most negatively affected by financial sector opening – whereas 
any benefits are likely to accrue across broader segments of the economy. 
Contrary to the argument that increased foreign ownership imports improved financial 
supervision, others have voiced concern over the multiple challenges to supervision raised by 
complex financial institutions active in a number of jurisdictions. These concerns are 
accentuated by asymmetries in information between home and host country supervisors. 
Even among those who support increased foreign ownership, many argue that the 
sequencing of such opening is critical, and that it should follow the consolidation and 
strengthening of the domestic financial system and/or the development of necessary financial 
infrastructure, including supervision. Most of these concerns are generally unsupported by 
empirical evidence. However, recent research into the sources of financial crises has fueled an 
                                                            
5 Burdisso, D’Amato and Molinari (1998) also show that bank privatization increased Argentine bank efficiency, 
and that consolidation of retail banking led to scale efficiency gains. Privatization led to reduced portfolio risk and 
more efficient allocation of credit.     5
additional concern by establishing a pattern in which financial crises tend to be preceded by 
financial liberalization (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Rojas-Suarez 1997). Such studies, 
however, generally have not focused specifically on, or identified the role of, foreign-owned 
financial institutions in contributing to or mitigating crises. The exception is Demirguc-Kunt, 
Levine and Min (1998): over the 1988 to 1995 period and for a large sample of countries, 
foreign bank entry was generally associated with a lower incidence of local banking crises. 
The need for an understanding of the implications of increased foreign bank presence 
is especially compelling in the wake of financial crises. In this context, foreign institutions may 
represent important sources of equity capital for domestic financial systems, especially in post-
crisis recapitalization efforts like those currently underway in Asia.  In addition to serving as a 
means towards accomplishing the goal of having an active and efficient private banking 
network, foreign institutions may bring important attributes not present in domestic financial 
institutions.   
 
Conceptualizing Differences Among Banks in Loan Supply and Volatility 
The crux of some of the arguments for and against foreign bank participation could be 
better understood within the context of a conceptual framework of bank lending volatility and 
funding availability. Specifically, we expect that lending patterns will vary among state-owned, 
private domestically-owned and private foreign-owned banks to the extent that there are 
corresponding differences in bank motives or goals, in balance-sheet health, and in funding 
sources.
6 These differences in motives, health, and funding diversity would influence the 
interest-rate sensitivity of loan supply by any bank, and the extent to which a bank expands or 
contracts lending in response to various market signals.  
Some of the points raised in the aforementioned debate on credit volatility hinge on the 
idea that interest rate sensitivity of lending is likely to be greatest for banks with closer ties to 
international capital markets, all else equal, given a wider access to profitable investment 
opportunities.  In emerging markets, banks with foreign affiliates are likely to have such ties, 
potentially leading them to have more interest-rate elastic loan supply than private 
domestically-owned banks.  Moreover, if profitability is more of a motive for private domestic 
                                                            
6 The exposition in this section closely follows from Goldberg (2000). In a domestic banking system, arguments 
about lending sensitivity to fluctuations follows the tradition of Peek and Rosengren (1997 and forthcoming) and 
Hancock and Wilcox (1998).   6
banks than for state-owned banks, the latter would be expected to have the lowest interest-rate 
sensitivity among this group.  
However, despite such presumed differences across banks, it is inappropriate to 
conclude that foreign banks will necessarily have more volatile lending patterns.  Loan supply 
and demand may differ across banks for numerous reasons. One reason is that banks may be 
distinct from each other in terms of lending motives with respect to the clients they serve. 
Under “transactions-based” lending, improved economic conditions generate opportunities for 
expanding production and investment. Bank loans expand to accommodate part of this 
demand. Alternatively, under “relationship lending” motives, bank lending helps established 
customers smooth over the effects of cyclical fluctuations or consumption smooth. In adverse 
economic conditions, lending expands to offset some of the revenue shortfall of clients; in 
good economic conditions, net lending by banks declines as borrowers pay back prior loans. 
Under these stylized conditions, relationship lending is counter-cyclical, while transactions-
based lending is pro-cyclical.  
The quality of bank balance sheets also can influence bank responsiveness to any types 
of market signals. Banks focussed on balance sheet repair will concentrate less on expanding 
loan availability when aggregate demand conditions improve, leaving profitable local 
investment opportunities under-funded. Thus, poor health of banks could be associated with 
reduced loan variability, lower sensitivity to market signals, and missed opportunities for 
profitable and efficient investment. An alternative and potentially more dangerous scenario 
arises when less healthy banks, instead of undertaking balance sheet repair, focus on lending 
expansion in a gamble for redemption. Overall, if the local banking system health is 
compromised, the presence of healthy foreign banks should reduce some of the negative 
current and future externalities attributable to unhealthy local lenders. In this scenario, foreign 
bank presence fills a domestic vacuum by providing finance for worthy local projects.     
Lending sensitivity across banks will also depend on the bank’s sources of loanable 
funds. If domestically-owned banks rely more heavily on local demand deposits and cyclically-
sensitive sources of funds,
7 basic aggregate demand shocks should generally lead to more 
volatile lending by private domestic banks than from their foreign-owned counterparts.  In the 
                                                            
7 As argued by Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998), local demand deposits are positively 
correlated with the local business cycle.   7
same vein, smaller domestic banks with more narrow funding bases are likely to demonstrate 
the greatest degree of credit cyclicality, all else equal.  
 
3.  Case Studies: Foreign versus Domestic Banks in Argentina and Mexico 
As we turn to the specific experiences of Mexico and Argentina, our goal is to 
document some patterns in lending activity and provide factual evidence on two main 
questions. First, did foreign bank participation in local markets deepen or diversify local 
financial markets and improve the stability of bank lending? And, second, did foreign bank 
participation increase the sensitivity of lending to market signals?  Our conceptual discussion 
leads us to expect that (healthy) foreign banks will be more sensitive to market signals than 
unhealthy banks or state-owned banks with different lending goals.  On the other hand, some 
types of aggregate fluctuations --- such as those arising from local GDP cycles --- may lead to 
more lending fluctuation by healthy local banks than by healthy foreign banks, especially if 
domestic banks have less diversified funding bases.    
Argentina and Mexico are both instructive case studies for examining the implications 
of broader foreign bank participation in domestic markets.  Over the course of the last decade, 
both countries implemented reforms facilitating foreign bank entry and then experienced a 
substantive internationalization of domestic financial markets, with the pace of foreign entry 
sharply accelerating in the wake of severe financial crises.  However, their experiences have 
also contrasted markedly with regard to the pace, depth and nature of foreign bank penetration.  
In Argentina, foreign banks now participate on an equal footing with domestic institutions and 
are active in all broad segments of the loan market.  In Mexico, foreign banks face a 
competitive landscape dominated by large domestic banks.  Furthermore, the financial sector 
as a whole remains in fragile condition with real loan growth yet to recover from the 1994 
Tequila Crisis. We briefly outline the experiences of each country, focusing on enabling 
financial sector reforms and the evolution of the foreign bank presence before turning to the 
data analysis.
  
   8
Argentina:  Financial Reforms and Foreign Entry  
Introduction of the Convertibility Plan in 1991 marked a turning point in Argentine 
financial history – heralding profound monetary and fiscal reform, broad deregulation of 
domestic markets, privatization of a majority of government-owned entities, trade 
liberalization, elimination of capital controls and, more generally, a macroeconomic 
environment conducive to foreign investment.  
The Convertibility Plan succeeded in stemming hyperinflationary pressures and 
restoring economic growth relatively quickly. Within the financial sector, this contributed to 
enhanced intermediation: credit to the private sector almost doubled, to 19% of GDP by year-
end 1994, up from close to 10% of GDP in 1990. Following the removal of restrictions on 
foreign direct investment and capital repatriation, the number of foreign banks operating in 
Argentina increased, but remained under 20% of system assets through year-end 1994 (Table 
1). 
 
Table 1:  Penetration of Foreign Banks into Argentine Lending Markets  
(as percentage of total lending in each category) 
 







Personal 25.4  48.5  45.8 
Mortgage 10.3  20.4  31.9 
Commercial, Government, & Other  19.0  37.4  53.2 
Total Loans  18.0  35.0  48.1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la 
Republica Argentina, various issues. 
 
Beginning in early 1995, contagion from Mexico’s Tequila Crisis severely tested the 
Argentine financial sector – sparking an outflow of almost 20% of system deposits. It was in 
the wake of the Tequila Crisis that the transformation of the Argentine financial sector 
accelerated. Efforts undertaken to re-establish confidence in the banking sector included the 
introduction of deposit insurance, a renewed commitment to privatizing inefficient public   9
sector banks, the liquidation and/or consolidation of nonviable entities, and the dedication of 
substantial resources to strengthening supervisory oversight and the regulatory framework. 
Within this context, foreign banks were permitted to play an important role in recapitalizing the 
Argentine banking system. 
Prior to the 1990’s, very few foreign banks were present in Argentina, with U.S.- based 
institutions – primarily Citibank and BankBoston – among the more active.  Subsequent entry 
occurred mainly via the acquisition of existing operations, with foreign shareholders acquiring 
stakes in private institutions with a national or regional franchise – generally in better condition 
and with stronger distribution networks than privatized provincial and municipal banks. Such 
acquisitions accelerated dramatically beginning in 1996 with foreign banks acquiring 
controlling stakes in a majority of Argentina’s largest private banks.
 8 By 1999, roughly half of 
banking sector assets were under foreign control (with foreign shareholders holding significant 
minority stakes in a number of other financial institutions).  
The growing foreign bank presence dramatically altered the competitive landscape of 
Argentina’s banking sector and catalyzed aggressive competition for market share, primarily 
via retail expansion.  As is evident in Table 1, foreign-controlled banks have been particularly 
successful in penetrating commercial, government, interbank and personal loan markets.   
While they still appear to lag domestic counterparts in mortgage lending, this may change in 
the wake of the January 1999 privatization of a controlling stake in the national mortgage bank.  
Overall, foreign and domestic banks in Argentina appear to compete aggressively in all 
segments of the local loan market. Details of foreign and domestic bank loan portfolios are 
provided in Table 2.
9  It is striking that foreign banks generally engage in the same types of 
broad lending activities as domestic banks, but are more heavily weighted toward relatively 
lower-risk commercial, government and other lending.
10  Overall, the recent growth in foreign 
                                                            
8 This distribution is documented in Appendix Table 1. The timing of acquisitions of domestic banks is 
documented in Appendix Table 2. 
9 Our sample of Argentine bank data was constructed by identifying and including all data for all banks that were 
among the largest 25 in any sample year.  This resulted in a total sample of 37 institutions, with as few as 25 
institutions and as many as 32 in any given quarter. All loan data that we discuss are measured in real terms, 
constructed using CPI deflators. Loan data come from various editions of the Informacion de Entidades 
Financieras, a publication of the Banco Central de La Republica Argentina. This publication was formerly 
entitled “Estados Contables de las Entidades Financieras.” Other data: Argentina Real GDP (source: Board of 
Governors, in thousands of 1986 pesos); Real interest rate was calculated using Nominal Interest Rate (period 
average) and CPI series from the International Financial Statistics. 
10 These findings are consistent with the observations of Burdisso, D’Amato, and Molinari (1999).   10
bank presence and in commercial and government lending share imply that foreign banks play 
an increasingly important role in this aspect of local financing. In addition, Argentine private 
lending patterns appear to be much more similar to those of foreign banks than to the lending 
patterns of state-owned banks. Like foreign bank portfolios, Argentine private banks tend to 
have lower mortgage shares and higher shares of commercial, government, and other lending.  
 
Table 2 Argentine Bank Loan Portfolio Composition 
(as percentage of Total Loans) 
Domestically-Owned Banks  
        State-Owned              Privately-Owned  Foreign-owned Banks 
Type of Loan  1994 1997 1999 1994 1997 1999  1994  1997  1999 
  Personal  5.2 5.8 5.9  13.2  10.4  6.1 14.1  13.3  5.5 




62.7 62.0 59.0 77.4 76.4 78.9  74.8  75.0  79.8 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco de Central la 
Republica Argentina, various issues. 
 
The foreign bank effect on  loan supply patterns in Argentina 
One key issue in the ongoing policy debate is whether patterns in loan issuance by 
banks have become more stable over time, as foreign banks have become more entrenched. 
Using lending data from individual banks operating in Argentina, we compute weighted and 
unweighted averages of quarterly bank loan growth rates. We report the mean of these growth 
rates over time. We also compute the standard deviations of the loan growth rates, normalized 
by mean levels of loan growth. These normalized standard deviations are an indicator of 
average volatility per unit of loan growth. The unweighted numbers reflect averages across 
banks, regardless of their importance in various lending markets. The weighted numbers reflect 
implications for overall availability of loans by the respective classes of lenders (state-owned, 
domestic private, foreign private banks).
11  
                                                            
11 For computing the reported statistics, we first calculate the percentage change in current loan volumes for each 
individual bank within each period.  Then, unweighted and weighted averages of these loan growth rates are   11
Among domestically-owned banks, the state-owned banks exhibit relatively low 
average loan portfolio growth.
12 The loan growth and volatility figures for these banks are 
quite striking in the crisis period, with average loan expansion close to zero and average 
normalized volatility at a very high level. In all periods, private foreign banks had both the 
highest quarterly loan growth and the lowest normalized variability of this growth. In the crisis 
and post-crisis periods, domestic private and foreign private banks had higher loan growth and 
lower normalized volatility than did domestic state-owned banks. 
 
 
Table 3: Argentina Average Quarterly Bank Loan Growth Rates  
 
(in percent, with normalized standard deviations reported in parentheses) 
 












Pre-Crisis   3.6 
  
3.8 2.4 5.0 
  
















   
Panel B: Weighted Average Across Individual Banks 
Pre-Crisis   2.2 
 
1.4 1.4 5.9 
 

















Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco de Central la 
Republica Argentina, various issues. For single missing observations, we use data averaged across prior and 
following periods. Calculations use real balances of outstanding loans of individual banks. The pre-crisis period 
for which data is available is 1994:2-94:3, too short for standard deviations on the average loan growth rates. The 
Tequila crisis period for Argentina is 1994:4-95:4. The post-crisis period ends 1999:2.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
constructed by period.  The mean and normalized standard deviations of these series over respective periods of 
time and for respective samples of banks are reported in the Table 3 for Argentina and in Table 8 for Mexico. 
12 State-owned banks include Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Banco 
Hipotecario, Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Banco de las Provincia de Cordoba, Banco de la Pampa, Bice, 
Caja Ahorro, and Banco Social de Cordoba.   12
When we consider the implications for lending volumes weighted by bank size (Table 
3, Panel B), the crisis and post-crisis periods register generally higher growth for all types of 
banks. These findings, in comparison with those of panel A,  imply that among all banks the 
larger banks grew faster than the smaller banks. Larger foreign banks have greater average loan 
growth and equal or lower average volatility per unit of loan growth than their public and 
private domestic counterparts.  
As we discussed in section 2, another metric of lending stability controls for whether 
changes in loan volumes arise because of differing responses to market signals; alternatively, 
changing loan volumes can be more random and unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Using time-series data from individual bank balance sheets, we perform pooled time-series 
regressions to test for differences across domestic, foreign, and state-owned banks in loan 
responsiveness with respect to real GDP and real interest rates.
13 This responsiveness is 
estimated using both weighted and unweighted regressions: weighted regressions measure the 
responsiveness of total lending by a class of banks, and unweighted regressions measure the 
responsiveness of an average bank regardless of its size. The difference across these types of 
regressions can be interpreted as suggesting differences across larger versus smaller banks (or 
across total lending volumes versus average bank behavior) in the respective specific lending 
areas, i.e., in total lending, mortgage lending, personal lending, and commercial and other 
lending. The results for 1996Q2 through 1999Q2 are summarized in Table 4, below.
14 
In the post Tequila-Crisis period, total lending by Argentine state-owned banks was 
largely insensitive to GDP and interest rate fluctuations, attributable to a lack of responsiveness 
                                                            
13 Specifically, we perform ordinary least squares regressions over the time-series panels of individual bank data. 
The percentage change in real loans (nominal loans deflated by the CPI) is regressed against the percentage 
change in real GDP, and levels of real interest differentials vis-à-vis the United States, and bank-specific fixed 
effects. Regressions test for differences in estimated  responses across banks in relationship to public, private 
domestic, or foreign ownership. “Gaps” in loan series, defined as missing observations with nonmissing 
observations for the time periods immediately before and after them, are filled in by taking the mean of the 
surrounding observations.  We also have generated results (available from the authors) based on an alternative 
methodology, using clustering of errors by quarter across all banks.  This approach specifies that the observations 
are independent over time (clusters) but not necessarily independent within a period.  The error correction 
algorithm affects the estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the 
estimated coefficients.  In general, as implemented this approach provides a more conservative view of the 
statistical significance of the estimated elasticities with respect to GDP and other time-series variables.  The terms 
that are marginally significant at the 10 percent level sometimes lose statistical significance at this level.  
14 In the regression results presented for Argentina and for Mexico, we do not report coefficients on interest rate 
terms. In all regressions, the estimated coefficients are small, so that a 1 percentage point increase in the interest 
rate differential is associated with a 0.01 to 0.03 percent change in loan volumes. These estimated effects often are   13
of both mortgage lending and commercial and related lending.
15  Personal lending, which only 
accounts for about 6 percent of the portfolio of state-owned banks, has been counter-cyclical. 
A 1 percent rise in GDP is associated with a 7.7 percent contraction in personal lending by the 
average state-owned bank, with a slightly higher contraction by larger banks. 
 
Table 4: Bank Loan Sensitivity to GDP, Argentina 1996 Q2-1999 Q2 
 
Panel A: Unweighted Elasticities  
 
 
















#  observations  90 73 73 73 








#  observations  104 101 101 101 








#  observations  143 140 140 140 
Domestic Private = 
Foreign Private?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Elasticities, Weighted by Bank Size 
























Domestic Private = 
Foreign Private?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are reported 
beneath the average elasticities drawn from OLS regressions over the percent change in real loans against bank 
fixed effects, the percent change in real GDP, and local real interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the United States. 
The equality test rows ask whether statistically the coefficients on private domestic and foreign banks may be 
equal to each other. Some outlier observations were omitted from the regression analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
not statistically significant. Generally, we cannot reject equality of interest rate coefficients on lending by 
domestic and foreign banks.  
15 This general insensitivity to market signals also characterized the loan volumes of public banks in the pre-crisis 
and crisis period for which we have data (1994Q2 to 1996Q1: see Appendix Table 3, Panels A and B.)   14
 
In stark contrast to the state-owned banks, private banks in Argentina -- both 
domestically owned and foreign owned -- have been significantly more responsive to economic 
signals in the post-crisis period.  Total lending tends to be pro-cyclical for both domestic and 
foreign banks, driven by the highly procyclical nature of lending to “commercial, government, 
and other” clients. This type of lending is consistent with transactions-based or arms-length 
activity. The point estimate of the cyclical response by domestic private banks (at 1.44) is 
stronger than the response by foreign banks (at 0.90), as would arise with domestic private 
banks more heavily reliant on local sources of funds. Yet, despite consistent patterns in the size 
of point estimates, statistically we cannot reject that both private domestic banks and private 
foreign banks have identical proportionate responses to cyclical forces in Argentina.   
Both types of privately-owned banks also have strong countercyclical patterns of 
personal lending. When GDP expands by 1 percent, personal lending contracts by 4.6 percent 
for the average domestic privately-owned banks and by 6.3 percent for their average foreign-
owned counterparts. Finally, a comparison of elasticities from the unweighted and weighted 
regressions suggests that smaller domestic banks have greater credit cyclicality compared with 
the larger domestic banks, which may lend additional support to the funding composition 
hypothesis.   
Overall, the evidence on loan activity in Argentina supports a claim of differences in 
behavior across state-owned banks and private banks.  However, domestic and foreign private 
banks exhibit comparable loan behavior, coexist in the distribution of larger and smaller banks 
within the top 25 banks nationally, and have similar composition of loan portfolios. The banks 
respond similarly to market signals, including real GDP growth and real interest rates.  Overall, 
foreign-owned banks appear to have provided greater loan growth than observed among 
domestic-owned banks, while reducing the volatility of loan growth for the financial system as 
a whole.  Foreign banks also exhibited notable loan growth during the crisis period, suggesting 
that foreign banks may be important stabilizers of credit during such episodes. It also is notable 
that state-owned banks had higher variability of lending, as well as having a smaller portion of 
this variability explained by macroeconomic fundamentals.  
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Mexico:  Financial Reforms and Foreign Entry  
In Mexico, recent efforts at financial liberalization began in the early 1990s with the re-
privatization of the financial sector, following a decade of nationalization and government-
orchestrated bank consolidation.
16 Following several years of rapid expansion by the newly 
privatized banks, however, Mexico’s financial crisis -- triggered by the 1994 peso devaluation -
- both revealed and exacerbated significant weaknesses in a large number of institutions. Since 
the crisis, authorities have responded with an array of support programs for financial 
institutions and their borrowers intended to bolster the health of the financial sector, and have 
also opened to foreign investment beyond the schedules that had been originally negotiated 
under NAFTA.
17 Pressures on bank condition, however, remain significant and widespread, 
and continue to be an important driver for Mexican bank behavior.  
Only one foreign bank, Citibank, was permitted to conduct local banking operations in 
the early 1990’s, accounting for less than 1 percent of total loans. With the initiation of 
NAFTA in 1994, restrictions on foreign bank participation were gradually eased. Initial 
entrants generally established very small de novo subsidiaries engaged in wholesale, non-loan 
banking activities. On average, these foreign bank operations consisted of a single branch 
office with fewer than 100 employees and captured about 0.1 percent of loan market share.  As 
Table 5 shows, in 1995 foreign banks cumulatively represented about 1 percent of the 
consumer and commercial, government, and interbank loans. 
Similar to the Argentina experience, it was in the aftermath of the 1994-1995 Tequila 
crisis that foreign banks began establishing a significant local retail presence (see Appendix 
Table 5)  Despite a variety of support programs, 12 Mexican banks (accounting for roughly 20 
percent of total loans) failed outright and were intervened by the authorities.  The subsequent 
sale of these franchises (or portions thereof) provided an avenue for foreign bank entry into, 
and partial recapitalization of, the Mexican retail banking sector.  As outlined in Appendix 
Table 5, there have been six foreign bank acquisitions of domestic retail operations since mid-
1995, with Spanish banks among the most active. There were 6 additional mergers of domestic 
banks with other domestic banks. 
 
                                                            
16 During the nationalization of the Mexican banking system, only two banks remained independent:  Citibank, 
which had been active in Mexico since 1929, and domestically- owned Banco Obrero. 
17 See Graf (1999), among others, for an extensive discussion of these reforms.   16
 
Table 5:  Penetration of Foreign Banks into Mexican Lending Markets  
(as percent of Current Loans in each category) 
 







Consumer  0.0 0.9  11.1 
Mortgage  0.0 0.0 6.4 
Commercial, Government, & 
Interbank  0.2 1.0  19.7 
Total Loans  0.2 0.7  17.8 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. 
 
  
By 1998, foreign bank participation in the local loan market had grown from less than 1 
percent prior to the crisis, to 18 percent (Table 5).  Foreign banks controlled 2 of the 6 largest 
banks (Santander Mexicano and BBV), held minority stakes in 3 more, and operated 19 fully-
owned local subsidiaries.
18 However, restrictions on foreign ownership remained in place until 
December 1998, prohibiting foreign control of Mexico’s three largest banks (in aggregate, 
almost 60% of loan market share).   
As is evident in Table 5, foreign bank lending is concentrated in the commercial, 
government and interbank sectors, with much lower penetration of consumer and mortgage 
markets. This concentration may be less a function of strategic considerations than of pervasive 
weaknesses in Mexico’s credit environment – characterized by high real interest rates, a 
reportedly reduced pool of creditworthy borrowers and breakdown in borrower discipline, and 
a legal environment which provides little creditor protection. This pattern is supported by a 
noticeable shift in domestic bank loan portfolios away from consumer and mortgage lending 
over this same time period, in part due to the government acquisition of a large portion of these 
loans in the wake of the crisis.   
As shown in Table 6, pre-crisis domestic lending to the consumer and mortgage sectors 
comprised about 30 percent of the lending portfolios of banks, a ratio that is very similar to 
                                                            
18 See Appendix Table 4.   17
ratios observed in Argentina.
19 However, by 1998 consumer and mortgage loans accounted for 
less than 18 percent of domestic bank loan portfolios, and only 6 percent of foreign lending. 
Foreign bank activity remained concentrated (93.6 percent) in the Consumer, Government, and 
Interbank market.  
 
 
Table 6: Mexican Bank Loan Portfolio Composition 
(as percentage of Total Current Loans) 
Domestically-Owned Banks  
 
Foreign -owned Banks 
 
Type of Loan   1992   1995  1998   1992   1995  1998 
 Consumer  12.0  5.6  3.3  0.3  6.9  1.9 




72.0 72.0 82.4  97.7  92.8  93.6 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Comision Nacional Bancaria y Valores. 
 
In addition to the factors noted above, the condition of Mexico’s banks over this time 
period has also played a significant role in influencing loan behavior. While objective 
measurement of Mexican bank condition is impeded by a lack of full transparency (e.g., not all 
banks publicly release financial statements) and changes in accounting standards over the 
sample period, a measure of impaired loans as a proportion of total loans can be used as a 
relative indicator of the depth of asset quality problems on bank balance sheets.  Impaired 
loans are here defined as the sum of reported non-performing loans, restructured loans, and the 
full amount of loans sold to the government.   
The vast majority of domestic banks (88 percent), representing the bulk of domestic-
bank lending in Mexico,  had impaired loan ratios (ILRs) under 10 percent at the beginning of 
1994 (Table 7).  By 1998, in part due to improved accounting and reporting conditions, 41 
                                                            
19 Our sample of Mexican banks includes all banks active within Mexico each year, where data are provided by 
the CNBV.  This sample comprises a universe of 59 banks over the 1990s, although the number of banks active in 
any given quarter varies due to bank closures, mergers, and acquisitions, as well as the establishment of de novo   18
percent of the banks (representing 93 percent of total lending by domestic banks) had impaired 
loan ratios exceeding 30 percent. While the bulk of foreign-owned banks (90 percent) 
remained relatively healthy, the larger foreign-owned retail franchises (accounting for 76 
percent for foreign bank lending) also had impaired loan ratios in excess of 30 percent at year-















Date  % Banks 
% Current 







1994  Q1  86.4  94.4  13.6  5.5 0.0 0.0  Domestic 
 
1998 Q4  58.8  7.2  0.0  0.0  41.2  92.8 
1994  Q1  100.0  100.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  Foreign 
  1998 Q4  90.0  24.1  0.0  0.0  10.0  75.9 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Comision Nacional Bancaria y Valores. Impaired 
loans are the sum of reported non-performing loans, restructured loans, and the full amount of loans sold 




The foreign bank effect on loan supply patterns  in Mexico 
  The data presented thus far show that foreign banks operating in Mexico have focussed 
their efforts mainly on commercial, government and interbank lending. Given the condition of 
the Mexican banking sector, the potential for a broad and positive role for healthy foreign 
banks therefore seems substantial. Foreign banks could be an important absolute and 
diversified source of credit to firms, especially in an economy where government-operated and 
domestic banks are heavily focused on balance sheet repair, instead of new lending. In this 
environment,  funds provided by foreign banks can be a source of much needed capital for 
local profitable growth opportunities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
operations.  The number of banks included in the analysis ranges from a low of 20 in 1991 and 1992 to a high of 
43 in 1996, and 37 at year-end 1998.   19
Our conceptualization of differences across banks which can lead to distinct lending 
behavior (section 2) emphasized bank health as a potentially important issue. Given the 
preponderance of impaired loans in Mexican banking in the second half of the 1990s, we 
consider the extent to which distinctions among banks in lending behavior are evident 
according to broad indicators of bank health. We use the ILR previously defined as an 
indicator of financial condition, whereby banks with an ILR in excess of 10 percent are 
considered to be in relatively poor financial health.  
  The loan growth activity and associated volatility by banks are documented in Table 8. 
Sorting banks each period according to whether their ILR falls below or exceed 10 percent, we 
observe significant differences in loan growth and the volatility of this growth across healthier 
versus less healthy banks.  These differences pertain to both domestically-owned and foreign-
owned banks. In general, banks with higher impaired loan ratios had more volatile loan growth 
rates and lower (or negative) rates of loan portfolio expansion than the banks with less 
problematic portfolios. In terms of average quarterly growth, both domestic and foreign banks 
with low ILRs continued to extend credit fairly steadily in the post-crisis period. In this 
healthier group, smaller foreign and domestic banks grew at a quicker pace than their larger 
counterparts, without increasing measured volatility per unit of loan growth. 
Lending by banks with low ILRs grew at high rates, leaving these banks to play an 
expanding role in mainly commercial finance, even as they remained a small part of the 
Mexican banking system (about 30 percent of the total current loans at the end of 1998). While 
the full financial system continues to show small average contraction in the post-crisis period, 
it is evident that the extent of this loan contraction has been reduced by the presence of foreign 
banks, and by healthy banks in general. As we observed in Argentina, the more extensive role 
played by foreign banks in Mexico does not appear to have come at the expense of larger 
lending volatility.    20
 
Table 8: Mexico Average Quarterly Loan Growth Rates  
 
(in percent, with normalized standard deviations reported in parentheses) 







ILR < 10 percent  
 
ILR > 10 percent  

































   


































For these calculations, we drop from our data sample the observations for individual new banks that represent 
their initial periods of entry and expansion. Inclusion of these initial data points would otherwise artificially show 
a sharp increase in the loan growth of foreign banks especially, along with higher variability of this loan growth.  
 
 
Next, we consider these lending fluctuations in the context of Mexican real demand 
growth and real interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the United States.
20  Since  a small number 
of very large banks have dominated lending activity in Mexico, we anticipate large distinctions 
between our results presented as averages across individual banks and averages over all 
lending, even when bank condition is considered. In general, however, the domestic banks with 
sounder reported asset quality ratios are smaller banks engaged in limited retail lending.  
In the post Tequila-crisis period (1995Q2 through 1998Q4), our sorting of banks 
according to domestic versus foreign ownership, and according to ILRs, is highly revealing 
                                                            
20 Raw Mexican loan data exhibit many extreme observations related to new bank entry, government intervention, 
mergers and acquisitions. We eliminate extreme single quarter changes from our sample.     21
(Table 9).
2122 In Mexico, on an un-weighted basis the most responsive banks to cyclical 
fluctuations were the domestically-owned banks with low non-performing loan shares 
(particularly smaller banks). Indeed, behavior by these banks is strikingly similar to the 
behaviors reported for the private banks in Argentina.  Lending to Commercial (et al.) clients is 
strongly pro-cyclical as consistent with transactions-based or arms-length lending, and as also 
observed in Argentina. Lending to Consumer and Mortgage clients is generally statistically 
insignificantly correlated with real GDP growth in Mexico. Our conceptual framework of 
section 2  anticipated the findings here that the banks with lower impaired loan ratios are more 
responsive to fluctuations and market signals than are banks with more problematic loan 
portfolios. 
Among the foreign banks operating in Mexico,  there appears to be a strong behavioral 
distinction among banks with lower ILRs versus the few observations of banks with higher 
ILRs. The foreign banks with low ILRs appear to behave similarly to domestically-owned 
banks with low ILRs.  As anticipated, and as observed in the Argentine case, the point 
estimates on responses are higher for the domestic banks in this group of banks with low 
impaired loan ratios. Their larger response elasticities to GDP stimuli are consistent with 
domestic banks having heavier reliance on domestic sources of funds.  Still, also as we 
observed for Argentine private banks, we cannot reject similar behavior by these banks with 
low ILRs but different nationalities of owners. The foreign banks with high ILRs behave 
differently from all categories of banks in our sample, with procyclical consumer lending and 
counter-cyclical commercial and other lending.  
                                                            
21 We present results using ILRs > 10 percent.  Broadly similar results also arose using higher ratios (20, 30, 50 
percent). The main difference is that the higher the ILRs of domestic banks, the lower their estimated 
responsiveness to cyclical fluctuations. Our regression results for domestic unhealthy banks are potentially biased 
by the fact that, once a bank is intervened by the Mexican government, data for that bank generally becomes 
unavailable. We have a total of 17 banks in our sample which were intervened; if we had data for all of the 
intervened banks going through the end of the sample period we would have an additional 100 observations on 
unhealthy banks to use in the regressions. If one assumes that intervened banks would on average be less 
responsive to market signals than nonintervened banks, then we would expect to see less responsiveness for this 
bank class as a whole if we had access to a more complete dataset for Mexico. 
22 We also have generated results (available from the authors) based on an alternative methodology, using 
clustering of errors by quarter across all banks.  This approach specifies that the observations are independent over 
time (clusters) but not necessarily independent within a period.  The error correction algorithm affects the 
estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the estimated coefficients.  In 
general, as implemented this approach provides a more conservative view of the statistical significance of the 
estimated elasticities with respect to GDP and other time-series variables.  The terms that are marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level sometimes lose statistical significance at this level.  
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Table 9: Bank Loan Sensitivity to GDP, Mexico 1995 Q2-1998 Q4 
 










  Banks with ILR < 10 percent 








# observations  153 78  50  153 








# observations 190  28  20  182 
Domestic = Foreign?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Banks with ILR > 10 percent 








# observations  178 165 159  178 








# observations  16  16  15  16 
 
Panel B: Elasticities Weighted by Bank Size 
  Banks with ILR < 10 percent 








# observations  153 72  46  152 








# observations 190  26  20  181 
Domestic = Foreign?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Banks with ILR > 10 percent 








# observations  178 165 158  178 








# observations  16  16  15  16 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
reported beneath the average elasticities drawn from OLS regressions over the percent change in real loans 
against bank fixed effects, the percent change in real GDP, and local real interest rate differentials vis-à-vis 
the United States. The equality test rows ask whether statistically the coefficients on private domestic and 
foreign banks may be equal to each other. For these calculations, we drop from our data sample the 
observations for individual new banks that represent their initial periods of entry and expansion.  
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Several findings stand out from this empirical analysis. First,  bank health appears to be 
a key factor distinguishing the responsiveness to market signals among both domestically-
owned and foreign-owned banks in Mexico. Second, point estimates show more volatile 
lending with respect to GDP by domestically-owned banks, a finding that is consistent with our 
conceptualization in section 2.  Specifically, if healthy domestically-owned banks (all else 
equal) rely more heavily on domestic sources of funding (particularly smaller banks),  lending 
by these banks will be more sensitive to local cyclical conditions than will be the lending by 
their foreign-owned counterparts.  In Mexico, we observe that foreign banks with low non-
performing loan shares have facilitated more overall responsiveness of the financial system to 
market forces, and were important providers of credit during the crisis period and beyond, in 
the context of financial system weakness.  These results would appear to confirm that  foreign 




4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
The Asian Crisis amply demonstrated a range of deficiencies in local financial systems, 
and has precipitated calls for reform in accounting and disclosure practices, bank corporate 
governance, and home country supervision and regulation. It is often argued that opening 
domestic financial sectors to increased foreign ownership can meaningfully accelerate 
improvements in all three areas, and should be (and historically has been) a key element of 
reform efforts in the aftermath of financial crisis. At the same time, various arguments 
emphasize the potential adverse effects of foreign ownership.  To date, the post-crisis financial 
landscape in Crisis Asia has been characterized by only limited examples of majority foreign 
ownership of domestic financial institutions.  
We have sought to contribute to the debate on financial sector openness in emerging 
markets by reviewing the experiences of Mexico and Argentina with foreign bank local 
lending.  We conclude that in both Mexico and Argentina, foreign banks exhibited stronger 
loan growth compared to all domestic-owned banks, with lower associated volatility, 
contributing to greater stability in overall financial system credit. Additionally, in both 
countries, foreign banks showed notable credit growth during recent crisis periods and   24
thereafter.  In Argentina, there have been striking similarities in the portfolio composition of 
lending and the volatility of lending by private foreign and private domestic banks. In 
Mexico, there are behavioral similarities in terms of cyclical fluctuations and loan portfolios 
among banks with similar low impaired loan ratios but different ownership. Both 
domestically-owned and foreign-owned banks with low problem loan ratios behaved 
similarly, and we find no evidence that the foreign banks were more volatile lenders than 
their domestic counterparts. The ranking of banks according to their responses to cyclical 
fluctuations is consistent with an outcome that arises when foreign banks bring to the 
emerging market a broader, more diversified supply of funds.  
Overall, these findings suggest that bank health, and not ownership per se, has been 
the critical element in the growth, volatility, and cyclicality of bank credit. Diversity in 
ownership has contributed to greater stability of credit in recent times of crisis and financial 
system weakness.  The positive first lessons from the Argentine and Mexican experiences are 
broadly instructive for other emerging markets as they contemplate more extensive foreign 
bank participation in their local economies.  
Of course, further analysis of these issues is essential. Additional country analysis, 
particularly of the Eastern European experience with opening domestic financial sectors to 
foreign ownership, would be useful.  Moreover, this analysis is based on the relatively recent 
experience with significant foreign ownership, and will need to be reviewed over a longer 
time frame, given a range of variables, including ongoing evolution of competition between 
foreign and domestic banks. The role of diversification of bank funding sources can also be 
further explored, as could the importance of parent-subsidiary relationships internationally, 
and the relationship between local and cross-border lending activities. Moreover, if local 
governments seek to maintain certain wholesale or retail services that would not survive the 
test of the market, there are broad policy questions to consider about the types of agencies 
that should be involved in these transactions, and the scope and methodologies for their 
implementation. Overall though, recent experience in Argentina and Mexico underscores the 
importance of healthy banks, both foreign- and domestic-owned to market-based, private 
sector lending in emerging markets. .  
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Appendix Table 1    Top 25 Argentine Financial Institutions: Credit Market Share 




Foreign Ownership  Voting Share/ Date 
1  Banco de la Nacion Argentina
s 10,113  12%     





11%    




8% O'Higgins Central 
Hispanoamericano 
10.0%/ 98:4 
4  Banco Rio de la Plata  5,530  7% Banco Santander Central 
Hispano 
64.3%/97:2 




6% BankBoston  100.0%/Before 94:2 
6  Banco Frances  5,151  6% Banco Bilbao Vizcaya  58.8%/96:4 
7 Citibank  4,524  5%  Citibank  100.0%/Before 94:2 
8 Banco  Hipotecario
s 4,122  5%     
9  HSBC Banco Roberts  2,706  3% HSBC  100.0%/1Q98 
10  Banca Nazionale del Lavoro  2,326  3% Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro 
100.0%/Before 94:2 
11 Banco  Bansud  2,077  3%  Banamex  60.0%/95:4 
12  Banco Quilmes  1,506  2% Bank of Nova Scotia  70.0%/95:1 





2%    




2%    
15  Banco del Suquia  1,122  1%     





1%    
17  Banco Bisel    
842 
1% Caisse Nationale de 
Credito Agricole 
30.0%/96:1 
18  Banco Tornquist  794  1% O'Higgins Central 
Hispanoamericano 
100.0%/95:4 
19  Banco Sudameris Argentina  757  1% Banque Sudameris  99.9%/Before 94:2 
20  Banco de la Pampa
s 700  1%     
21  ABN Amro Bank  674  1% ABN Amro  100.0%/95:2 
22  Lloyds Bank  666  1% Lloyds Bank  100.0%/Before 94:2 




1%    
24  Banco Mercantil Argentino  636  1%     




1% Societe Generale  75.4%/Before 94:2 
  Loan Subtotal of Top 25 Banks  70,128  85% Foreign Share of Top 25   46.4 % 
  Total System Loans  82,544  100%     
 
*Data at November 1998. Source:  Estados Contables de las Entidades Financieras, Banco de la Republica Argentina 
 
s indicates state-owned through end of 1998.   28
 
Appendix Table 2 
Summary of Argentina Bank Mergers 
Bank Name  Acquiring Bank  Date of Acquisition  
Foreign Banks Acquiring Domestic Banks: 
Banesto Shaw   Banamex, via Bansud  Q495 
Del Sud   Banamex, via Bansud  Q495 
Credito Argentino  Bilbao Vizcaya  Q397 
Quilmes*  Bank of Nova Scotia  Q497  
Roberts HSBC  Q198 
Rio de la Plata  Santander  Q297 
Frances Bilbao  Vizcaya  Q496 
Foreign Banks Acquiring Foreign Banks: 
Credit Lyonnais 
(formerly Tornquist) 
O’Higgins Central Hispano  Q196 
Deutsche Bank  BankBoston  Q197 
 
Quilmes was effectively controlled by Bank of Nova Scotia by Q195, although a majority stake was not 
acquired until Q397.   29
 
Appendix Table 3: Bank Loan Sensitivity to GDP, Argentina 1994 Q2-1996 Q1 
 






























# observations  99 99  98  99 








# observations 65  65  59  65 
Domestic Private = 
Foreign Private?   Yes No*  Yes  Yes 
 
Panel B: Elasticities Weighted by Bank Size 



























Domestic Private = 
Foreign Private? On GDP  Yes No**  Yes  Yes 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
reported beneath the average elasticities.  These results are drawn from ordinary least squares regressions 
over the percent change in real loans against individual bank fixed effects, the percent change in real GDP, 
and local real interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the United States. The equality test rows ask whether 
statistically the coefficients on private domestic and foreign banks may be equal to each other. Some outlier 
observations were omitted from the regression analysis. 
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Appendix Table 4: Mexican Financial System, Total Lending, by Institution 
 
(Millions of Pesos, December 1998) 




Share Foreign  Owner 
(nationality) 
Stake (entry date, F if 
foreign controlled) 
Total 
872,485  100.0% (None)  
Banamex 186,245  21.3% (None)  
Bancomer 191,407  21.9% Bank of Montreal (Canada)  17.0%   (March 96) 
Serfín 115,680  13.3% HSBC, JP Morgan (US)  29.0%   (December 97) 
Bital 56,897  6.5% Santander, BCP (Spain)  16.0%   (September 93) 
Santander Mexicano  49,618  5.7% Santander (Spain)  52.0%   (September 97, F) 
Bilbao Vizcaya  52,899  6.1% BBV (Spain)  67.0%   (March 96, F) 
Centro 21,305  2.4% (None)  
Mercantil del Norte  25,003  2.9% (None)  
Banpaís 27,132  3.1% (None)  
Citibank 16,900  1.9% Citibank (US)  100.0%   (December 91, F) 
Interacciones 3,145  0.4% (None)  
Inbursa 21,999  2.5% (None)  
Mifel 2,202  0.3% (None)  
Invex 1,702  0.2% (None)  
Banregio 1,358  0.2% (None)  
Del Bajío  2,912  0.3% Sabadell (Spain)  10.0%   (December 98) 
Quadrum 1,411  0.2% (None)  
Ixe 2,482  0.3% (None)  
J. P. Morgan  1,327  0.2% J. P. Morgan (US)  100.0%   (September 96, F) 
Chase Manhattan  9  0.0% Chase Manhattan (US)  100.0%   (June 96, F) 
Afirme 4,991  0.6% (None)  
Fuji Bank  831  0.1% Fuji Bank (Japan)  100.0%   (June 95, F) 
Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi  907  0.1% Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi (Japan)  100.0%   (March 95, F) 
Bank of America  989  0.1% Bank of America (US)  100.0%   (June 95, F) 
ABN Amro Bank  537  0.1% ABN Amro Bank (Netherlands)  100.0%   (September 95, F) 
Republic National Bank  605  0.1% Republic National (US)  100.0%   (September 95, F) 
Banco de Boston  518  0.1% Bank of Boston (US)  100.0%   (December 95, F) 
B. N. P.  1,002  0.1% B. N. P. (France)  100.0%   (December 95, F) 
Bansi 663  0.1% (None)  
Dresdner Bank  2,414  0.3% Dresdner (Germany)  100.0%   (March 96, F) 
Societé Generalé  445  0.1% Societé Generalé (France)  100.0%   (March 96, F) 
I.N.G. Bank  1,460  0.2% I.N.G. Bank (Netherlands)  100.0%   (June 96, F) 
First Chicago  66  0.0% First Chicago (US)  100.0%   (September 96, F) 
GE Capital (Alianza)  1,005  0.1% GE Capital (Alianza)  100.0%   (December 97, F) 
American Express  391  0.0% American Express (US)  100.0%   (June 96, F) 
Nations Bank  64  0.0% Nations Bank (US)  100.0%   (December 96, F) 
Comerica Bank  2,410  0.3% Comerica Bank (US)  100.0%   (September 97, F) 
Source: Boletin Estadistico de Banco Multiple, Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores.   31
 
Appendix Table 5: Summary of Mexico Bank Mergers 
 





 The following mergers involve foreign banks buying  domestic banks: 
Merprob Bilbao  Vizcaya  -------  Q196 
Oriente Bilbao  Vizcaya  Q195  Q396 
Cremi Bilbao  Vizcaya  Q394  Q396 
Mexicano Santander  Mexicano  ------  Q297 
Confia Citibank  Q397  Q398 
Alianza GE  Capital  -----  Q497 
The following mergers involve domestic banks buying domestic banks: 
Union Bancomer  Q394  Q295 
Obrero Afirme  Q295  Q197 
Sureste Internacional  (BITAL)  Q296  Q198 
Atlantico Internacional  (BITAL)  Q497  Q198 
Centro  Mercantil Del Norte  Q395   Q297 
Banpais  Mercantil Del Norte  Q195  Q397 
The following mergers involve foreign banks buying foreign banks: 
Chemical Chase  -----  Q296 
Santander de Negocios  Santander Mexicano  ------  Q497 
 
Source: Effective dates of acquisitions, mergers, and interventions, compiled from press accounts and data 
provided by the CNBV. 
 
 